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THE METHODOLOGY USED TO INTERPRET CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE 
 
G Pienaar
* 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The  South  African  legal system  is  based  predominantly  on  a  mixture  of  civil  law 
(Roman-Dutch)  and  English  Common  Law
1  principles.
2  Not  only  South  African 
common law principles  established and applied by  case law, but  also  legislation 
forms part of this mixture.
3 In academic writing Roman-Dutch, European civil law and 
English Common Law jurists are mainly cited as authority for South African common 
law principles, thus firmly establishing the South African legal system as a mixed 
jurisdiction. In this respect Zimmermann observed:
4   
 
At the same time, however, English law had started to infiltrate and a process was 
set in motion that ultimately transformed Roman-Dutch law in South Africa into a 
mixed legal system with its own identity: neither purely Roman-Dutch nor purely 
English  but  an  anglicized,  specifically  South  African  usus  modernus  of  Roman-
Dutch law. 
 
However, a third component of the mix, namely indigenous or customary law, does 
not always receive the same attention. In this regard the South African Constitution 
of 1996
5 explicitly states that "the Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any 
                                                           
*   Gerrit Pienaar. B Jur et Com LLB LLD (PU for CHE). Professor in Property Law, North-West 
University (Potchefstroom). Email: gerrit.pienaar@nwu.ac.za. 
1   When referring to the English Common Law, capital letters are used to distinguish the concept 
from South African common law, which is a mixture of civil (Roman-Dutch) and English Common 
Law principles. 
2   Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 4-5, who refer to the doctrinal history of the South 
African private law with reference to publications by several South African writers (especially fn 
19). For an exposition of the relationship between Roman-Dutch and English legal principles, see 
3.2 below. 
3   Examples of legislation predominantly based on Roman-Dutch legal principles are the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937; Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965; Prescription Act 68 of 1969; 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975; Game Theft Act 105 of 1991 and Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act 57 of 1993. Examples of legislation predominantly based on English Common Law 
principles are the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944; Companies Act 
61 of 1973 and 71 of 2008; Land Survey Act 8 of 1997; Banks Act 94 of 1990; National Water Act 
36 of 1998 and Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2002.   
4   Zimmermann "Double Cross" 5; also Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 10-12; Hahlo 
and Kahn South African Legal System 131-138. 
5   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution). G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary 
law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill".
6 
  
The  same  is  true  in  the  case  of   other  jurisdictions  where  indigenous  law  and 
common  law  are  recognised.  Canada  is  also  classified  as  a  mixed  jurisdiction 
because the Canadian common law is based on English  Common Law, European 
civil law (predominantly applied in Quebec) and the customary law of the native 
Indian  population,  or  First  Nations.
7  Therefore,  a  comparative  study  of  the 
development and application of South African and Canadian legal principles offers a 
fascinating insight into the mutual influence of the  three  different components of 
these jurisdictions. 
 
One of the areas of the law where the interaction between the different components 
of the legal system is c learly illustrated is customary or indigenous land tenure. In 
Canadian and South African land tenure the mutual influence of common law (in the 
case of Canada English Common Law property principles and in the case of South 
Africa Roman-Dutch property  law  principles)
8  and customary law principles  has 
already been the object of extended litigation.
9 The nature of the customary l and 
tenure  and  the  protection  of  right  holders  were  authoritatively  settled  by  the 
Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Constitutional Court and have been 
comprehensively discussed by academic writers.
10 
 
                                                           
6   Section 39(3) Constitution; see also Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 
(CC) paras 51 and 56. 
7   Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 11; Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure 9; 
Cairns-Way 2009 Ottawa L Rev 9-10.  
8   In South Africa Roman-Dutch principles were mainly applied to private law topics and English 
Common Law principles to public law topics, but this was never a water-tight distinction and is no 
longer strictly applied. In this regard see Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 131-138; 
Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 4-6. 
9   Cf the Canadian trilogy of cases Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC), an 
appeal from a case heard in the first instance by the Supreme Court of British Columbia 1991 3 
WWR 97 and thereafter heard by the British Columbia Court of Appeal 1993 5 WWR 97, with the 
South African trilogy of cases Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC), 
Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) and Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld 
Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC). 
10   For South Africa, see for instance Hoq 2002 SAJHR 421-443; Ülgen 2002 Journal of African Law 
131-154; Mostert and Fitzpatrick 2004 TSAR 309-323, 498-510; Pienaar 2005 THRHR 533-545, 
2006 1-13; for Canada, see for instance Ülgen 2000 NILR 146-180; Lippert (ed) Beyond the 
Nass Valley; Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure.        G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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Therefore, the purpose of this paper is not to repeat a description of the nature, 
protection  and  application  of  customary  land  tenure,  but  to  concentrate  on  the 
methodology used to interpret these rights. As the extent and application of these 
rights  are  not  based  on  codified  or  statutory  sources
11  but stem from customary 
traditions and norms, the normal rules of legal interpretation cannot be followed. This 
paper compares the way in which predominantly westernised courts in Canada and 
South Africa  interpret the customary values of land use in order to determine the 
nature of the land tenure rights. 
 
2  Main jurisprudential tendencies of legal analysis 
 
The methodology used to interpret legal principles is based on legal analysis. In both 
the civil law and Common Law systems two main tendencies of theoretical thought 
were developed historically and jurisprudentially, namely legal positivism and natural 
law.
12  These two tendencies  have  influenced  the basis of legal  analysis in most 
western legal systems to some extent, and in this context also the application of 
indigenous law. 
 
2.1  Legal positivism 
 
The term 'positivism' has many meanings,
13 but in the sense of 'legal positivism' it is 
mainly used to denote the analysis of  'the law as it is', in contrast to  'the law as it 
ought to be' (natural law). Although the official beginning of the positivism movement 
is often stated as the start of the nineteenth century,
14 its roots are found in the early 
and medieval philosophical theories. The positivistic theories concentrated mainly on 
"overly strict adherence to authority, the intricate web of rules and constructions in 
which all intellectual activity was enmeshed and the exaggerated subtlety of th e 
                                                           
11   The existence of customary land tenure is recognised by legislation, though; cf s 35(1) Canadian 
Constitution Act, 1982, and ss 8(1), 39(3) and 211(3) South African Constitution.  
12   There  are  also  other  theoretical  and  jurisprudential  tendencies,  namely  historical  and 
anthropological  approaches,  the  economic  approach,  the  sociological  approach  and  modern 
realism. In this regard see Dias Jurisprudence 381-595; Legrand and Munday (eds) Comparative 
Legal Studies 125-128; Glenn Legal Traditions of the World 131-194.     
13   Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 601 n 25.   
14   Dias Jurisprudence 381. G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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trivial distinctions drawn by the schoolmen".
15 Legal positivists were (and  still are) 
therefore more concerned with applying legal principles rigidly as they appeared and 
were received from the Corpus Juris Civilis, formal precedents,  legislative measures 
and immemorial custom, than with looking into the moral implications of laws and 
legal customs and the discovery of principles of universal validity.
16 The founders of 
English positivism, Jeremy Bentham (1748 -1832) and John Austin (1790 -1859), 
were characterised by their intellectual love of order, precision and the classification 
of the law as it is. They distinguished between formal analysis, on the one hand, and 
historical and functional analysis on the other hand,  both being the sources of the 
law 'as it is'.
17  
 
The historical school or Pandectists developed positivism further by  concentrating 
mainly  on  the  incorporation  of  principles  from  the   Corpus  Juris  Civilis  into  the 
German legal system. The most famous proponents of this school were Friedrich 
Karl  von  Savigny  (1779-1861)  and  Bernard  Windscheid  (1817-1892).  They 
endeavoured to deduce a logical and watertight system of general principles from 
Justinian law as they interpreted it.
18 Legal positivism was received in South Africa 
mainly  through the influence of the Pandectists, wh o  are still regarded by many 
South African  lawyers and  legal scholars as the true proponents of  the  classical 
Roman law principles upon which the South African common law is based.
19 
 
The most important criticism against legal p ositivism is that it  promotes formalistic 
and rigid legal concepts based on the strict paradigm of law as it is (or  is perceived 
to be), without taking moral and social circumstances  sufficiently into consideration. 
The way the positivist jurisprudence of Bentham and Austin influenced the Canadian 
                                                           
15   Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 32. 
16   Dias Jurisprudence 544-545; Fuller 1958 Harv L Rev 630-672. 
17   Dias Jurisprudence 382-383; Du Plessis 1961 SALJ 458; Dugard 1971 SALJ 184-185. 
18   Many Pandectist principles are not based on pure Justinian law, but on the integration of these 
principles with German historical customary law; see Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand 
Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314 1319; Van der Walt Ontwikkeling van Houerskap 453-457; 
Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 177-179. 
19   See e.g. Green v Fitzgerald 1914 AD 88; Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279; Regal v African 
Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA  102 (A).  See also  Van  Blerk  Purists' in South African Legal 
Literature  24-36;  Dugard  "'Purist'  Legal  Method"  36-37  who  both  refer  to  the  positivism  of 
supporters of the Pandectists and the 'purist' movement in respect of Roman-Dutch law.            G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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case law, and the Pandectist positivism of Von Savigny and Windscheid influenced 
South African case law, will be pointed out in 3.1 and 3.2 below respectively. 
 
2.2  Natural law 
 
The main premise of natural law is that law is based not only on the positive law 
created by man, but on law as it ought to be, which is dictated by a natural and 
higher order. This means that moral and social considerations must be taken into 
account in the formulation and application of legal principles. The idea of natural law 
stemmed  mainly  from  Greek  and  early  Roman  philosophy  and  jurisprudence, 
although  a  deeper  or  higher  legal  order  was  already  part  of  the  early  Jewish 
tradition.
20 In the Greek philosophical tradition Aristotle (384 -322 BC) distinguished 
between particular or positive law, and law which is common or natural, emphasising 
the need not only for formal laws but also for just laws moulded in reason.
21 During 
pre-classical Roman law (509-27 BC) this idea was further developed by Cicero, who 
was inspired by the dialectical method of Aristotle.
22 St Augustine (AD 354-430) was 
one of  the first Christian philosopher s  to  contribute to the idea of a divine law 
separate from  positive law.  The idea of divine law was further developed by   the 
Spanish  Moral  Philosophers
23  and  Roman-Catholic  theologians  like  St  Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274), but this was gradually replaced by later legal positivistic views 
which were enforced and practised by most of the universities during the  Middle 
Ages.
24 In reaction to the mainly positivistic views propagated by most universities, 
Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) a (later) Protestant follower of Jean Calvin, developed 
the  'Ramus  method'.  His  philosophy  was  characterised  by  a  general  and  all -
embracing reliance on meth od  in accordance with preconceived rules  based on 
reason as the most fundamental aspect of scientific behaviour.
25 This view in turn 
influenced Roman-Dutch jurists like Hugo Grotius, Simon van Leeuwen and Ulrich 
                                                           
20   Dias Jurisprudence 555-558.  
21   Dias Jurisprudence 561-563; Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 34-36.  
22   Dias Jurisprudence 563; Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 35. In his 
Topics Aristole distinguished between the demonstrative and dialectical methods of acquiring 
knowledge,  with  the  latter  being  that  branch  of  scientific  theory  which  reasons  from  readily 
acceptable opinions and seeks conviction.    
23   Van der Walt Ontwikkeling van Houerskap 258-269.   
24   Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 35-36. 
25   Van  der  Merwe  "Ramus,  Mental  Habits  and  Legal  Science"  49-56;  Van  der  Walt  2006 
Fundamina 23-24.  G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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Huber to methodically rearrange the Justinian civil law in a system dominated by 
axiomatic, self-evident principles based on human reason. Derek van der Merwe
26 
states in this regard that sixteenth-century legal humanism, with its incisive textual 
criticism and developed historical sense, had eroded t he absolute authority of the 
Roman codes. The Ramist method emphasised a new adherence to natural reason, 
and rejected mere recourse to authority. It appealed to those legal scholars, such as 
Roman-Dutch jurisprudents, who sought to develop a legal system which was based 
on, but not enmeshed within, the Roman tradition. 
 
Natural law is therefore perceived as incorporating universally valid principles which 
are not dependant on human legislative intervention. It does not separate legal and 
moral issues and is a criterion against which any historical law, including Roman law, 
can be tested, although many Roman legal principles were also principles of natural 
law. Therefore, the main contributions of natural law are the emphasis on morality as 
part of a universal, higher legal order that has to be adhered to in a legal system , 
and natural reason without mere recourse to authority. 
 
2.3  Indigenous law 
 
The  indigenous  law  systems  of  South  Africa  and  Canada  are  distinctive  legal 
systems applied for generations before any colonists settled. These systems have 
since survived meaningful assimilation with the principles of English Common Law 
(Canada) and Roman-Dutch law (South Africa). In both jurisdictions these systems 
have typical characteristics.
27  They are unwritten customary law passed  on orally 
from generation to generation and have strong ties with culture, tradition and tribal, 
community or family structures.
28 The laws are both young and old  – the legitimacy 
of custom depends on its age, but the custom is never older than the memory of the 
oldest living person in the family or tribe. There is no distinction between law within a 
                                                           
26   Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 58; see also Van der Walt 2006 
Fundamina 25; Dugard 1983 SALJ 215 indicates that Grotius's emphasis on "the law of nature 
as a dictate of reason". Some modern supporters of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa, the so-
called 'purists', emphasise the formalisation of Roman-Dutch principles to such an extent that 
they lose track of the moral and social implications embodied in natural law. See also fn 19.          
27   Dias Jurisprudence 445-447; Du Plessis Introduction to Law 67-68; Bennett Customary Law 1-7; 
Ülgen 2000 NILR 156-158; Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 13-17.  
28   Bennett Customary Law 2-4. G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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state structure and law applied between individuals, because there are normally no 
strong  governmental  and  administrative  structures  of  an  indigenous  nature. 
However,  the  customs  and  social  practices  are  accepted  as  obligatory.
29  Typical 
indigenous law in small-scale societies is based mainly on family, communal or tribal 
ties. The rules are fluid according to the circumstances , cannot be classified, and 
may therefore overlap and contradict one another. 
 
Social and moral standards form part of indigenous law in both Canada and South 
Africa.
30 Apart from religious customs observed by indigenous communities  as part 
of indigenous law, social and moral standards are included into and applied as part 
of the indigenous legal system.
31 In most indigenous societies law and religion  are 
intertwined. Many of the cultural customs form part of the religion of the family or 
tribe. For example,  a society's religious ceremonies are often expressed as their 
spiritual  connection  with  the  land  they  occupy .
32  However,  in  most  traditional 
societies there is a phenomenon that can be isolated from religious and other social 
observances  for  which  the  term  'law'  would  be  convenient.  Legal  positivism, 
especially during the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, eroded this moral fibre of many 
indigenous  communities  by  ignoring  the  social  origins  of  indigenous  law  and 
concerning  itself  mainly  with  the  inner  workings  of  a  westernised  legal  code.
33 
Therefore lawyers firstly had to define a set of indigenous rules and then had to 
order them into a consistent system  for use by the courts . In this process it was 
irrelevant how the rules were implemented in indigenous societies and whether they 
were morally or politically legitimate to indigenous communities. The application of 
positivism as a legal doctrine resulted in condemning indigenous law to the obscurity 
of a sub-legal order. Indigenous law was therefore often seen as a body of habi ts, 
conventions and moral standards which could be ignored by policy makers, lawyers 
                                                           
29   Bennett Customary Law 1. Colonial governments developed legal systems to control indigenous 
populations  and  systems,  but  these  systems  were  based  not  on  indigenous  law  but  on  the 
constitutional and administrative law of the conquerors.   
30   Bennett Customary Law 9. 
31   Dias Jurisprudence 446; Bennett Customary Law 9. Regarding the spiritual connection with land, 
see Henderson Constitutional Framework of  Aboriginal Law Tab 7 1 3-4  and  13; also 3.1(a) 
below. 
32   Dias Jurisprudence 446. 
33   See 3.1 and 3.2 below for examples of legal positivism and the non-recognition of indigenous law 
principles.   G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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and government officials.
34 In 3 below the influence of legal positivism on case law in 
South Africa and Canada will be pointed out. 
 
Indigenous law received constitutional recognition in Canada
35 and South Africa
36 
and is applied subject to constitutional imperatives. Indigenous law in Canada forms 
part of the Canadian common law, consisting of English Common Law, civil law and 
indigenous law. In South Africa, indigenous law  "feeds into, nourishes, fuses with 
and becomes part of the amalgam of South African law".
37 
 
3  Interpretation of factual evidence: two case studies  
 
The  integration  and  interpretation  of  legal  principles  from  different  sources  are 
regarded  as  the  most  complicated  aspects  of  any  mixed  legal  system.
38  This is 
illustrated  by  the  way  Canadian  and  South  African  courts  have  analysed  the 
evidence  presented  to  them  in  cases  regarding  the  nature  and  application  of 
indigenous land tenure. 
 
3.1  Aboriginal title in Canada 
 
                                                           
34   Bennett  Customary  Law  9;  Lawrence  2001  Canadian  Journal  of  Women  and  the  Law  113; 
Cairns-Way 2009 Ottawa L Rev 9-10.   
35   Section 35(1) Constitution Act, 1982. 
36   Sectionss 39(3) and 211(2) Constitution, 1996: "A traditional authority that observes a system of 
customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes 
amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs" and s 211(3): "The courts must 
apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation 
that specifically deals with customary law".    
37   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC) para 51. See also para 56: "The 
dangers of looking at indigenous law through a common-law prism are obvious. The two systems 
of  law  developed  in  different  situations,  under  different  cultures  and  in  response  to  different 
conditions". See also Lea Property Rights 95-119.  
38   See Dainow (ed) Role of Judicial Decisions; Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 2-4; 
Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure 9 state: "[R]econciling Aboriginal tenure with 
Crown sovereignty means uncovering a complex history of layered understandings and multiple 
translations that constitute the written and unwritten record of the British common law. Rules of 
evidence  alone  are  inadequate  to  interpret  the  history;  knowledge  of  the  broader  cultural, 
political, economic, religious, and historical context is required".  G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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In the Canadian case Delgamuukw v British Columbia
39 an area of 58 000 square 
kilometers of British Columbia was claimed by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en people, 
based on their  ownership (an inalienable fee simple)
40 of the territory, which claim 
was subsequently transformed into a claim for aboriginal title over the land.
41 The 
Gitksan consist of approximately 4 000 to 5 000 persons, most of whom live in the 
territory claimed, while the Wet 'suwet'en consist of approximately 1 500 to 2 000 
persons living predominantly in the territory claimed. The appellants' initial claim was 
based on their historical use and  'ownership' (an inalienable fee simple)
42 of one or 
more of the territories. The trial judge held that these territories are marked by 
physical and tangible indicators of their association with the land, like totem poles 
and other distinctive regalia. In addition, the Gitksan Houses have an  'adark', which 
is a collection of sacred oral traditions about their ancestors, histories and territories, 
while the  Wet'suwet'en Houses have a  'kanga', which is a  collection of  spiritual 
songs  or  dances  which  ties  them  to  their  land.  Both  of  these  indicators  were 
presented as evidence on behalf of the appellants. The most significant evidence of 
the spiritual connection between the Houses and their territory is a feast hall where 
they tell and retell their stories and identify their territories to remind themselves of 
the sacred connection that they have with their lands.
43  British sovereignty over 
British Columbia was established by the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846. There 
was consensus among the parties that proof of historic occupation was required to 
establish aboriginal title. The appellants argued that aboriginal title could be proven 
by  reference  to  the  pattern  of   landholdings  under  aboriginal  law,  while  the 
respondents were of the opinion that  title can be proven by the reality of physical 
occupation of the land in question only. 
 
                                                           
39   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC), an appeal from a case heard in first 
instance by the Supreme Court of British Columbia 1991 3 WWR 97 and an appeal heard by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 1993 5 WWR 97. 
40   McNeil "Aboriginal Title" 57. See also Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 14: "A person who 
holds a fee simple on land is for all practical purposes the absolute  owner of the land.  …In 
theory, under the English doctrine of tenures, all lands owned by private individuals are held of 
the Crown, which has the underlying and ultimate title to land. The main practical significance of 
the Crown's ultimate title is that the land reverts to the Crown if the owner dies without leaving an 
heir to the estate". See also 4 below. 
41   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 7. 
42   McNeil "Aboriginal Title" 57. 
43   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 93 and 94; Slattery "Nature of 
Aboriginal Title" 11. Regarding the spiritual connection with land, see Henderson Constitutional 
Framework of Aboriginal Law Tab 7 1 3-4 and 13. G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
162 / 183 
 
The trial judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia rejected the claims of the 
appellants because three aspects of the evidence presented by the appellants were 
not regarded as sufficient proof of their land tenure rights: 
 
(a)  Although their ancestors communally possessed and used the fishing sites 
and adjacent lands for hunting and gathering purposes, the appellants did not 
prove that they had aboriginal title (ownership) over the territory in its entirety, 
because  the  judge  was  not  persuaded  that  there  was  any  system  of 
governance or uniform custom relating to the land outside the villages. He 
refused to accept that the spiritual beliefs exercised within the territory were 
necessarily common to all of the people or universal practice. 
 
(b)  The  appellants'  claim  for  jurisdiction  over  the  territories  (aboriginal 
sovereignty)
44  was  rejected  bec ause  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  crown  at 
common  law,  as  well  as  the  relative  paucity  of  evidence  regarding  an 
established  governance  structure  and  a  legal  system  which  is  'a  most 
uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed  
by the Indians themselves' (para 20). 
 
(c)  The appellants' further claim for the exercise of aboriginal rights (e.g. hunting, 
fishing and trapping) in the disputed territories was also rejected. The judge 
was  convinced  that  the  aboriginal  people  in  the  disput ed  territories  ha d 
continued to exercise these rights even after the establishment of British 
sovereignty, but that the aboriginal rights to land had been extinguished. The 
extinguishment arose out of certain colonial enactments that demonstrated an 
intention  to  manage  crown  lands  in  a  way  that  was  inconsistent  with 
continuing aboriginal rights. Crown grantees who received land in colonial 
times were clearly intended to receive the land free from any  aboriginal 
encumbrances. This intention to extinguish  applied not only to land that had 
                                                           
44   This would include the right to enforce existing aboriginal law, as well as to make and enforce 
new laws for the governance of the people and their land. Such a right would also supersede the 
laws of British Columbia if the two were in conflict – Delgamuukw v British Columbia[1997 3 SCR 
1010 (SCC) para 20. G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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actually been granted to third parties, but rather to all crown land in British 
Columbia.
45 
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal subsequently confirmed this judgment
46 and 
the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada .  The Supreme Court 
referred the case back to the trial court for a retrial as a result of the trial court 's 
rejection of evidence by the claimants in the form of oral histories and legends, and 
the trial court's inability to approach the rules of evidence and interpret the evidence 
 
…  with  a  consciousness  of  the  special  nature  of  aboriginal  claims  and  the 
evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there were 
no written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in. The courts 
must  not  undervalue  the  evidence  presented  by  aboriginal  claimants  simply 
because that evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards 
that would be applied in, for example, a private law tort case.
47 
 
The trial judge held, with reference to St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co v The 
Queen 1888 14 AC 46,
48 that aboriginal title is a personal and usufructuary right that 
cannot be defined in terms of Common Law fee simple. Therefore, it is clear that the 
trial court's methodology of interpreting the evidence was based on the requirements 
to prove Common Law rights and not aboriginal title as practised by the appellants. 
The  legal  positivist  inclination  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  British  Columbia  and  the 
Appeal  Court  of  British  Columbia  is  evident  from  these  judgments.  Both  judges 
defined aboriginal rights and title in terms of English Common Law principles.
49 On 
appeal the Supreme Court  of Canada  found that subsequent jurisprudence ha d 
attempted to grapple with this definition,  "… and has in the process demonstrated 
that the Privy Council's choice of terminology is not particularly helpful to explain the 
various dimensions of aboriginal title".
50 Aboriginal title is  therefore defined by the 
                                                           
45   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 23 and 24. 
46   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1993 5 WWR 97. 
47   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 80. 
48   Apparently this personal and usufructuary right simply entailed a bundle of particular rights to 
engage in specific culture-based activities on the land; alternatively the right to exclusive use and 
occupation  of  the  land  in  order  to  engage  in  specific  activities.  See  also  Slattery  "Nature  of 
Aboriginal Title" 14-15. 
49   See 2.1 above. 
50   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 112. The Supreme Court rejected 
the notion that aboriginal title is a mere personal and usufructuary right, as well as the claim that 
it is an inalienable fee simple, and stressed the sui generis nature of aboriginal title as a property 
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Supreme  Court  as a  sui generis  interest  in  land, because  it does  not  stem from 
aboriginal customary law, English Common Law or French civil law, but co-ordinates 
the interaction between these systems without forming part of it: 
 
Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis  in order to distinguish it from 
'normal' proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now develop, it 
is  also  sui  generis  in  the  sense  that  its  characteristics  cannot  be  completely 
explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the 
rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it 
must  be  understood  by  reference  to  both  common  law  and  aboriginal 
perspectives.
51 
 
The Supreme Court clearly moved away from the positivistic approach of the two 
preceding  courts  by  defining  aboriginal  title  in  accordance  with  indigenous  land 
tenure principles, but subject to the underlying title of the crown. 
 
3.2  Indigenous land tenure in South Africa 
 
The Richtersveld saga
52 is based on a land claim  which was first instituted in the 
Land Claims Court (LCC),
53 where the plaintiffs alleged that they have ( i) a right to 
land based on ownership, alternatively (ii) a right based on aboriginal title allowing 
them the exclusive beneficial occupation and use of the land,
 54 alternatively (iii) a 
right in land acquired through their beneficial occupation of the land for a period of 
longer than ten years prior to their eventual dispossession.
55 The LCC held that the 
Richtersveld community constituted a community for the purposes  of the Restitution 
of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, but rejected the land claim on the grounds that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 11-13. See also the authority cited by  Slattery "Nature of 
Aboriginal Title" 27 n 1 and Guerin v R 1984 SCR 335 382. 
51   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 112. The Common Law doctrine 
that all Canadian land is subject to the underlying title of the crown is also applicable to aboriginal 
title.  
52   The Richtersveld is a large area of land situated in the north-western region of the Northern Cape 
Province  of  South  Africa  bordering  Namibia.  It  has  for  centuries  been  inhabited  by  the 
Richtersveld community. The land claim relates to a narrow strip of land on the western side 
parallel to the Atlantic Ocean (the subject land) which is at present owned by the first defendant, 
Alexkor Ltd, a public company whose sole shareholder is the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and which has been mining on the subject land for diamonds since 1992. Diamonds 
were discovered in this area during the first half of the twentieth century.   
53   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC). 
54   The  specified  purposes  are  habitation,  cultural  and  religious  practices,  grazing,  cultivation, 
hunting, fishing, water trekking and the harvesting and exploitation of natural resources. 
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plaintiffs  were  dispossessed  during  1925  for  the  purpose  of  the  exploration  and 
mining  of  diamonds,  and  not  because  of  racially  discriminatory  legislation  or 
practices.
56 The Richtersveld community appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal  
(SCA),
57  who reversed the judgment of the LCC and found that the Richtersveld 
community  had  a  right  akin  to  common  law  (Roman-Dutch)  ownership  which 
constitutes a customary law interest in land as defined in the Act,
58 of which they 
were dispossessed in 1925 when diamonds were discovered on the subject land.
59 
This dispossession was based on racially discriminatory practices as defined in the 
Act. Thereafter Alexkor Ltd, the def endant, appealed to the Constitutional Court  
(CC)
60  and contended that any rights in the subject land which the Richtersveld 
community might have held prior to the annexation of that land by the British Crown 
in 1847 were terminated by reason of such annexation. They contended further that 
the dispossession of the subject land after 19 June 1913
61 was not the consequence 
of racially discriminatory laws or practices.
62 
 
The evidence presented by the Richtersveld people was that t he British crown 
acquired the Richtersveld by proclamation on 17 December 1847. The annexation of 
the Richtersveld took place after a process of consultation between the colonial 
government and the recognised political leaders of Little Namaqualand, including the 
leaders of the Richtersveld people. The LCC held that the plaintiffs had no right to 
the  claimed  land based on ownership, as no indigenous land rights survived the 
annexation,  and that the colonial government regarded the Richtersveld as  terra 
nullius because the inhabitants were insufficiently civilised (para 37-41). This finding 
was  rejected  by  the SCA  (para  35). The SCA first  attempted  to  determine  if  the 
doctrine  of  aboriginal  title  could  be  incorporated  in  the  South  African  law  by  the 
                                                           
56   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC) para 114. 
57   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA). 
58   In s 1 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 a right in land is defined as "any right in land 
whether  registered  or  unregistered,  and  may  include  the  interest  of  a  labour  tenant  and 
sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement 
and  beneficial  occupation  for  a  continuous  period  of  not  less  than  ten  years  prior  to  the 
dispossession in question".  
59   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 90-110. 
60   Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC). 
61   In terms of s 2(1)(d) and (e) Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 only a dispossession of a 
right in land after 13 June 1913 (the date of promulgation of the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 - the 
first of the apartheid land acts) as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices gives rise to 
a land claim and such a land claim had to be instituted before 31 December 1998. 
62   Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 10. G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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development of the common law in the same way as that in which it was developed 
in other countries with a colonial history.
63 The SCA held that aboriginal title is rooted 
in  and  is  the  creature  of  traditional  laws  and  customs  (par a  36-43).  The  only 
requirement for the acquisition of aboriginal tit le is that the indigenous community 
must have had exclusive occupation of the land at the time when the crown acquired 
sovereignty. However, the SCA indicated that there are several hazards associated 
with the recognition of aboriginal title in South African law.   
 
The SCA also rejected the finding of the LCC that the claimed land was terra nullius 
at the time of annexation because the people were insufficiently civilised (para 41).
64 
The SCA considered whether the Richtersveld community had a right to land at the 
date of annexation, and whether  or not this right survived annexation by the British 
crown. The SCA decided on this aspect:
65 
 
During argument in this Court it was conceded on behalf of both respondents
66 that 
at the time of annexation the Richtersve ld people had a customary law interest 
under their indigenous customary law entitling them to the exclusive occupation and 
use of the subject land and that this interest was akin to the right of ownership held 
under common law.
67 In my view, counsel were dr iven to this concession by the 
uncontested facts.  
 
The  legal  positivistic  inclination  of  these  two  courts  is  evident,  as  both  courts 
hesitated to break with established common law (Roman-Dutch) principles. Although 
the SCA regarded it as unnecessary to consider the recognition of the doctrine of 
aboriginal title, or to consider the development of the common or customary law (as 
a  customary  law  interest  in  land  akin  to  common  law  ownership  of  land  by  the 
Richtersveld people was recognised), they deemed it necessary to discuss the effect 
of  annexation  on  these  rights.
68  It  was  conceded  by  the  respondents  that  the 
Richtersveld  people  were  sufficiently  civilised  to  refute  the  notion  that  the 
                                                           
63   Section 8(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that a court may apply or 
develop the common law to give effect to any fundamental right protected in the Bill of Rights and 
s 39(2) stipulates that in the interpretation of any legislation, and when developing the common 
law and customary law, every court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. S 211(3) Constitution has the same measure regarding customary law.  
64   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC) para 48; Richtersveld Community 
v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 25. 
65   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 26. 
66   Alexkor Ltd and the South African Government. 
67   My italics. 
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Richtersveld, including the subject land, was terra nullius.
69 From the evidence it was 
also clear that the colonial government did not regard the Richtersveld as  terra 
nullius, as the rights to land of the original inhabitants were recognised by the Dutch 
East  India  Company  during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,
70  and the 
British crown during the nineteenth century. Therefore, the indigenous land rights of 
the Richtersveld people were recognised by the Articles of Capitulations when the 
British crown acquired sovereignty during 1806  and were  further strengthened by 
Ordinance 50 of 1828.
71 The SCA held that the Richtersveld was not uninhabited 
and not amenable to acquisition by occupation or settlement  and concluded that the 
existing customary law interest in the subject land held by the Richtersveld people 
survived British annexation.
72 But it was still held in the final instance that the right to 
occupy the claimed land is a right akin to the right of ownership held under common 
law. 
 
On appeal the Constitutional Court (CC) confirmed the finding of the SCA that the 
Richtersveld community held a customary law interest in the subject land within the 
definition of 'a right in land' in the Restitution Act.
73 However, the CC did not agree 
with  the  description  of  the  substantive  content  of  the  interest  as  "…a  right  to 
exclusive beneficial occupation and use, akin to the right of ownership held under 
common law".
74 The nature and content of the rights of the Richter sveld community 
to the claimed land must be determined by reference to indigenous law, and not the 
common law.
75 It was proven by the evidence that the Richtersveld people's right to 
the land survived annexation and therefore the nature and content of their right ha d 
to be determined according to their indigenous law and custom until the date of their 
dispossession. In this regard the CC cautioned:
76 
                                                           
69   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 46-47. 
70   Bennet "African Land - A History of Dispossession" 66. 
71   Section 3 Ordinance 50 of 1828. 
72   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 61. 
73   Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 48. 
74   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 29. 
75   With reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Oyekan v Adele 1957 2 All ER 785 (PC) at 
788G-H, where it was held that a dispute between indigenous people as to the right to occupy a 
piece  of  land  has  to  be  determined  according  to  indigenous  law  "without  importing  English 
conceptions of property law". 
76   Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 51. See also para 56: "The 
dangers of looking at indigenous law through a common-law prism are obvious. The two systems G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must 
now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law it depends for its ultimate 
force  and  validity  on  the  Constitution.  Its  validity  must  now  be  determined  by 
reference not to common law, but to the Constitution. The courts are obliged by s 
211(3) of the Constitution to apply customary law when it is applicable, subject to 
the Constitution and any legislation that deals with customary law. … It is clear, 
therefore, that the Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of 
indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system. At the 
same time the Constitution, while giving force to indigenous law, makes it clear that 
such law is subject to the Constitution and has to be interpreted in the light of its 
values.  Furthermore,  like  the  common  law,  indigenous  law  is  subject  to  any 
legislation,  consistent  with  the  Constitution,  that  specifically  deals  with  it.  In  the 
result, indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the 
amalgam of South African law. 
 
While  the  SCA's  methodology  to  interpret  the  evidence  was  based  on  their 
endeavour to keep as close as possible to (Roman-Dutch) common law principles, 
the CC recognised the peculiar characteristics of indigenous law as part of the South 
African  law,  which  is  to  be  applied  subject  to  constitutional  principles  and  not 
common law principles.  
 
4  The methodology used to interpret evidence 
 
The methodology used to interpret evidence in respect of indigenous land tenure 
was  prescribed  by  both  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court  and  the  South  African 
Constitutional  Court.  In  the  Delgamuukw  case  the  Supreme  Court  laid  down  the 
following evidentiary principles in the light of the peculiar nature of aboriginal title: 
 
(a)  Evidence  in  respect  of  aboriginal  title  differs  from  evidence  in  respect  of 
aboriginal  rights.  Aboriginal  rights  are  defined  in  terms  of  activities  (e.g. 
hunting, trapping and fishing).
77 To be acknowledged as an aboriginal right 
such activity must be an element of the practice, custom or tradition integral to 
the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right. However, 
aboriginal title, as a species of aboriginal rights, is a right to the land  itself. 
Subject to the inherent limitations of aboriginal title, the land may be used for 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
of  law  developed  in  different  situations,  under  different  cultures  and  in  response  to  different 
conditions". 
77   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 140; see also R v Van der Peet 
1996 2 SCR 507 para 74. G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
169 / 183 
 
a  variety  of  activities,  none  of  which  need  to  be  individually  protected  as 
aboriginal rights under section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act (e.g. the 
exercise  of  mineral  rights).  Those  activities  are  parasitic  on  the underlying 
aboriginal  title.
78  The  purpose  of  section  35(1)  is  to  reconcile  the  prior 
presence of aboriginal peoples with the assertion of  crown sovereignty. The 
requirement of prior presence can only be satisfied by proof of two aspects: 
 
(i) the occupation of the land; and  
(ii) the  prior  social  organisation  and  distinctive  cultures  of  aboriginal 
peoples on that land.
79 
 
(b)  The onus to prove aboriginal title rests on the aboriginal group claiming such 
title.  The  Supreme  Court  has  laid  out  the  analytical  framework  for 
constitutional claims under section 35(1).
80 The court must determine: 
 
(i)  whether the aboriginal claimant was acting pursuant to an aboriginal title 
(onus to prove rests on the aboriginal group); 
(ii) whether  that  title  has  been  extinguished  (onus  to  prove  rests  on  the 
crown); 
(iii) if  not  extinguished,  whether the  title  has  been  infringed  (onus  to  prove 
rests on the aboriginal group); 
(iv) whether the infringement is justified (onus to prove rests on the crown). 
 
In order to establish aboriginal title ((b)(i) above), the following must be proven by the 
aboriginal group: 
 
(aa)  The land must be occupied prior to sovereignty. 
 
                                                           
78   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 140; see also R v Van der Peet 
1996 2 SCR 507 para 74. 
79   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 141; R v Van der Peet 1996 2 
SCR  507  para  74.  Prior  to  the  Delgamuukw  case  the  second  aspect  had  been  given  more 
emphasis, as the types of cases which had come before the Supreme Court often concerned 
regulatory offences that proscribed discrete types of activity. See also Henderson Constitutional 
Framework of Aboriginal Law 3-4. 
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While the requirement for the establishment of aboriginal rights in general is based 
on  the  activities  exercised  at  the  time  of  first  contact  with  the  settlers,
81  the 
requirement for the establishment of aboriginal title is the occupation of the disputed 
lands at the time the crown asserted sovereignty over the land.
82 Therefore the time 
period in the case of aboriginal title differs from aboriginal rights in general. This time 
period is important, as aboriginal title is  based not only on prior occupation before 
sovereignty, but also on the relationship between the common law and pre -existing 
systems of aboriginal law. In terms of common law principles the crown owns all land 
from the time when it asserted sovereignty, but aboriginal title is a burden on the 
crown's underlying title.
83 Because it does not make sense to speak of a burden on 
the  underlying  title   before  that  title  existed,  aboriginal  title  was  established 
('crystallised') at the time sovereignty was asserted. 
 
Physical  occupation  may  be  established  by  the  construction  of  dwellings,  the 
cultivation and enclosure of fields,  the regular use of tracts of land for hunting and 
fishing, or the exploitation of its resources. The group 's size, way of life, material 
resources and technological abilities, as well as the character of the dispute d lands, 
should also be taken into consideration. A claim to abori ginal title could also be 
made when a group could demonstrate that their connection with a piece of land was 
of  central  significance  to  their  distinctive  culture,  although  the  judge  was  not 
prepared to explicitly include this element as  one of the tests for aboriginal title, as 
"..it would seem clear that any land that was occupied pre -sovereignty, and which 
                                                           
81   R v Van der Peet 1996 2 SCR 507 para 60: "(T)he time period that a court should consider in 
identifying  whether  the  right  claimed  meets  the  standard  of  being  integral  to  the  aboriginal 
community claiming the right is the period prior to contact". [My emphasis] In the case of the 
proof of aboriginal rights the emphasis is mainly on the exercise of culture-specific activities prior 
to the arrival of Europeans. Practices, customs and traditions that arose solely as a response to 
European influences do not meet the standard for recognition as aboriginal rights – Delgamuukw 
v  British  Columbia  1997  3  SCR  1010  (SCC)  para  144.  See  also  Henderson  Constitutional 
Framework of Aboriginal Law 4-7. 
82   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 142 and 145. 
83   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 145; see also Slattery "Nature of 
Aboriginal Title" 13. The crown after sovereignty gained ultimate title to lands held by aboriginal 
people, after which the aboriginal group held a communal title at common law that formed a 
burden on the crown's ultimate title. See also Slattery 1987 Can Bar Rev 742; McNeil Common 
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the  parties  maintained  a  substantial  connection  with  since  then,  is  sufficiently 
important to be of central significance to the culture of the claimants".
84 
 
(bb)  There must be continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation. 
 
As conclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty occupation is often difficult to obtain, an 
aboriginal community may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of pre-
sovereignty  occupation.  In  addition  to  this,  it  is  required  that  continuity  between 
present  and  pre-sovereignty  occupation  exists,  because  the  relevant  time  for  the 
determination of aboriginal title is at the time before sovereignty. There is no need to 
establish an unbroken chain of continuity, because the occupation and use of lands 
may  have  been  disrupted  for  a  time,  often  as  a  result  of  the  unwillingness  of 
colonisers to recognise aboriginal title. To impose the requirement of continuity too 
strictly  might  undermine  the  very  purpose  of  section  35(1)  by  perpetuating  the 
historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hand of colonisers who failed 
to  respect  aboriginal  rights  to  land.
85  Therefore  the  requirement  should  be  a 
substantial maintenance of the connection between the people and the land. There 
is also a strong possibility that the precise nature of occupation will have changed 
between the time of sovereignty and the present. Normally such a change would not 
preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the 
people and the land has been maintained.
86  The only limit to this might be the 
internal  limitation  on  the  use  of  aboriginal  land ,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the 
continued use by future generations of aboriginals.
87 
 
(cc)  Occupation must have been exclusive at sovereignty. 
 
This requirement flows from the definition of aboriginal title as the exclusive use and 
occupation of land.
88 The exclusivity vests in the aboriginal community which holds 
                                                           
84   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 149-151; see also R v Adams 
1996]3 SCR 101 para 26. 
85   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 153; see also R v Côté 1996 3 
SCR 139 para 53 and a reference to Mabo v Queensland 1992 107 ALR 1. 
86   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 154. 
87   See in this regard 3 above. 
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the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title.
89 As in the case 
of the proof of occupation, the proof of exclusivity must place equal weight on  the 
aboriginal perspective and the common law perspective. Common law relies heavily 
on  the  exclusivity  derived  f rom the  notion  of fee  simple ownership  as  held  by 
Europeans,  and  should  be  used  in the  concept  of  aboriginal  title  with  caution. 
Therefore, the test required to establish exclusive occupation must take into account 
the context of the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty. Exclusive occupation 
can  be  proven  even  if  other aboriginal  groups  were  present or frequented the 
disputed lands. Under those circumstances exclusivity would be demonstrated by 
the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control .
90  Thus an isolated act of 
trespass would not undermine the exclusivity of the occupation, if an aboriginal 
community intended to and attempted to enforce their exclusive occupation. Where 
outsiders were allowed access upon request, the fact that they asked for permission 
would be evidence of the community's exclusive control. 
 
To the same extent trespass by other aboriginal groups or communities does not 
necessarily refute a claim for aboriginal title, as an aboriginal community may have 
trespass laws which are proof of their intention to maintain exclusive occupation, or 
their granting of permission to other groups or communities may be used as proof of 
their exclusive control.
91 In the event of a lack of proof of exclusive occupation, an 
aboriginal  community  or  person  who  proves  occupation  together  with  other 
communities may establish an aboriginal right to use the land in question. This is an 
aboriginal right short of title. Such rights might be intimately tied to the land and 
might permit a number of site-specific activities, but they are not rights to the land 
itself, and can therefore not be acknowledged as aboriginal title. 
 
In order to prove the indigenous land tenure of the Richtersveld people in the 
Richtersveld case, the SCA analysed the evidence of experts regarding the nature of 
their rights prior to annexation (para 13-22); at annexation (para 23-29) and after 
annexation (para 30-51). From the evidence, which was not contested in either the 
                                                           
89   Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 155. 
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LCC or the SCA, it was clear that before annexation the Richtersveld people shared 
the  same  culture,  including  the  same  language,  religion,  social  and  political 
structures,  customs  and  lifestyle.  One  of  the  components  of  the  culture  of  the 
Richtersveld people was the customary rules relating to their entitlement to and use 
and  occupation  of  the  land.  The  land  belonged  to  all  of  the  members  of  the 
Richtersveld community, who were entitled to the reasonable occupation and use of 
the land and its resources. All of the members of the community had a sense of 
legitimate access to the communal land to the exclusion of all other people. Non-
members had to obtain permission to use the land, for which they sometimes had to 
pay. The Richtersveld community also had rules related to criminal and civil law such 
as the prohibition of adultery, assault and theft, the recognition of private property 
rights of movables, rules of inheritance and the obligation to pay compensation for 
damage to private property. The SCA came to the conclusion that at the time of 
annexation  the  Richtersveld  community  had  for  a  long  time  enjoyed  exclusive 
beneficial occupation of the whole of the Richtersveld (including the claimed land) in 
the course of their semi-nomadic existence. The rules and decisions of their political 
structure (raad) were recognised by both the indigenous inhabitants and others, like 
missionaries and traders. With reference to Canadian sources especially, the SCA 
held that occupation of the land has to be determined according to the following 
requirements (para 23-25): 
 
  Uninterrupted presence on and use of the land at the time of annexation. This 
requirement need not amount to possession at common law. 
 
  A nomadic lifestyle is not inconsistent with the exclusive and effective right of 
occupation of land by indigenous people. Although the Richtersveld people's 
use of the land may have been only seasonal, and may have been sparse 
and intermittent, that did not mean that they did not have exclusive beneficial 
occupation of the land, which other people respected. 
 
Although the SCA regarded it unnecessary to consider the recognition of the doctrine 
of aboriginal title or to consider the development of the common or customary law, 
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Richtersveld people was already recognised, they deemed it necessary to discuss 
the  effect  of  annexation  on  these  rights.
92  According  to  international  law,  the 
establishment of sovereignty over new territory could be effected by conquest or 
cession  if  the  territory  was  inhabited ,  or by  occupation  if  it  was  uninhabited.
93 
Occupation of inhabited territory was based on the fiction that if a territory was 
inhabited by people regarded as insufficiently civilised, it could be acquired by 
occupation as if it were uninhabited and therefore  terra nullius. It is clear from the 
uncontested evidence of the expert witnesses that the Richtersveld people had a 
social and political organisation, including a civil and criminal legal system based on 
traditional laws and customs, at the time of the annexation. It was also conceded by 
the respondents that the Richtersveld people were sufficiently civilised to refute the 
notion that the Richtersveld, including the claimed land, was terra nullius.
94 From the 
evidence  it  was  also  clear  that  the  colonial  governme nt  did  not  regard  the 
Richtersveld as  terra nullius, as the rights to land of the original inhabitants were 
recognised by the Dutch East India Company during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries,
95 and the British crown during the nineteenth century. The indigenous land 
rights of the Richtersveld people were recognised by the Articles of Capitulation 
when the British crown acquired sovereignty during 1806. It was further strengthened 
by Ordinance 50 of 1828.
96 Therefore, the SCA found that the Richtersveld was not 
uninhabited  and  not  amenable  to  acquisition  by  occupation  or  settlement.  The 
indigenous  inhabitants  were  also  sufficiently  civilised  to  refute  the  notion  of 
occupation  of  terra  nullius  (para  52).  Thus  the  territory  was  obtained  by 
proclamation.  The  SCA  compared  the  doctrine  of  recognition  (which  entails  that 
annexation of the land by the British crown resulted in the abolition of all pre-existing 
customary rights and interests except those rights explicitly recognised by the crown) 
with the doctrine of continuity (that there is a presumption that a mere change in 
sovereignty  does  not  extinguish  the  private  and  customary  property  rights  of  the 
inhabitants of the conquered territory, unless confiscated by an act of state).
97 After 
                                                           
92   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) paras 43-51. 
93   See text at n 70 above. See also Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure 284-300.  
94   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) paras 46-47. 
95   Bennett "African Land – A History of Dispossession" 66-67. 
96   Section 3 Ordinance 50 of 1828. 
97   Bennett & Powell 1999 SAJHR 480. See also Mabo v The State of Queensland (No 2) 1992 175 
CLR  57:  "The  preferable  rule,  supported  by  the  authorities  cited,  is  that  a  mere  change  in 
sovereignty does not extinguish native title to land. (The term "native title" conveniently describes G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
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analysing the international precedent on this matter, the SCA accepted the doctrine 
of continuance and concluded that the existing customary law interest in the subject 
land held by the Richtersveld people survived British annexation.
98 
 
The content of the customary law intere st in land also encompasses a right to 
minerals and other natural resources.
99 The SCA especially relied on the evidence 
that  the  Richter sveld  people  had  mined  and  used  copper  for  the  purpose  of 
adornment long before annexation and that they app reciated the value of minerals. 
They had even granted mineral leases to outsiders as early as 1856. The evidence 
clearly established that the Richtersveld community believed that  they had the right 
to minerals and that they  had acted in a manner consistent with such a  belief. The 
minerals had been exploited without requesting permission from anyone to do so , 
and  strangers  and  non -inhabitants  respected  the ir  rights  by  obtaining  their 
permission to prospect for minerals, and even concluding mineral leases with them. 
Although there was no proof of mining activities by the Richtersveld community on 
the subject land itself, it  was clear from the evidence that at the time of annexation 
the  mining  for  and  use  of  minerals  was  part  of  the  distinctive  culture  of  the 
Richtersveld people,
100 who appropriated for themselves the right to minerals and 
natural resources on the land, and that this custom had been continued from earlier 
days. 
 
The CC confirmed the finding of the SCA that the Richtersveld community held a 
customary law interest in the subject land within the definition of 'a right in land' in the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.
101 However, the CC did not agree with the description 
of  the  substantive  content  of  the  interest  as  "…a  right  to  exclusive  beneficial 
occupation and use, akin to that held under common-law ownership".
102 The nature 
and content of the rights of the Richtersveld community to the subject land was to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
the  interests  an  the  rights  of  indigenous  inhabitants  in  land,  whether  communal,  group  or 
individual,  possessed  under  traditional  laws  acknowledged  by  and  the  traditional  customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants).The preferable rule equates the indigenous inhabitants 
of a settled colony to the rights and interests recognised by the Privy Council in In re Southern 
Rhodesia as surviving to the benefit of the residents of a conquered colony". 
98   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 61. 
99   Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) paras 85-89. 
100  With reference to R v Van der Peet 1996 SCR 289 para 60. 
101  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 48. 
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determined  by  reference  to  indigenous  law,  and  not  the  common  law.
103  It was 
proven by the evidence that the Ri chtersveld people's right to the  claimed  land 
survived annexation
104 and therefore the nature and content of their right ha d to be 
determined according to their indigenous law and custom up to t he date of their 
dispossession. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Although the lower courts in Canada and South Africa clearly demonstrated their 
positivistic preference to adhere to the established land tenure structures of Anglo-
American Common Law and Roman-Dutch law respectively, it is commendable that 
the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Court of South Africa have 
recognised  the  peculiar/special  nature  of  indigenous  land  tenure  in  the  form  of 
aboriginal title and indigenous ownership. The fact that the moral and spiritual nature 
of indigenous land tenure is recognised constitutionally is an exciting development in 
both jurisdictions. 
 
The fact that specific requirements have to be met to prove indigenous land tenure 
precludes  the  positivistic  adherence  to  established  common  law  principles.  The 
characteristics of indigenous land tenure differ to such an extent from westernised 
legal  concepts  in  respect  of  land  tenure  that  indigenous  land  tenure  cannot  be 
described in terms of the established common law terminology as 'a right akin to 
Roman-Dutch ownership' or 'a personal and fiduciary right'. This necessitates that 
special evidence in concurrence with the characteristics of indigenous land tenure is 
needed to prove indigenous people's land tenure rights. 
                                                           
103  With reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Oyekan v Adele 1957 2 All ER 785 (PC) at 
788G-H, where it was held that a dispute between indigenous people as to the right to occupy a 
piece  of  land  has  to  be  determined  according  to  indigenous  law  "without  importing  English 
conceptions of property law". 
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